Cost of living
Use some of the growth. Keep building your super.
The Super Growth Dividend would give people paying into super a choice: take some of their investment growth as cash before retirement, or leave it all invested.
The proposal is for a payment of up to $10,000 every three years, up to four times. Payments would come only from growth above a baseline that rises with inflation and new contributions.
A major repair. An unexpected bill. Some breathing room. You would choose what to use it for, without a means test or having to justify the purchase.
A choice about now and later
Super is there for retirement. But the bills do not wait until retirement. This proposal asks whether contributing members should have a limited choice about using some of their investment growth earlier.
The question is whether useful relief today is worth the reduction in future savings. Members should be able to see both amounts before deciding. Those who prefer to leave everything invested would do exactly that.
How it would work
| Feature | Proposed setting |
|---|---|
| Payout | 75% of account growth above the CPI-indexed floor |
| Dollar cap | $10,000 per payout, with proposed indexation |
| Frequency | One payout every three years |
| Number of payouts | Four in total, then the scheme ends |
| Eligibility | Sustained contributions and informed opt-in |
| Starting point | Member choice, with the retirement cost disclosed in advance |
How the baseline works: start with the member’s balance, adjust it for inflation and add new contributions. Only growth above that line would be available for a payout. The member could take 75% of that eligible growth, up to the dollar cap.
After a bad year: the line would not reset downwards. The account would have to recover any shortfall before another payment. A payout would not lower the line either.
The safeguards
- A record of contributions. A one-off top-up just before withdrawal would not qualify someone.
- A clear comparison. Show the payment alongside its estimated effect on retirement savings before the member opts in.
- Time to reconsider. A cooling-off period before the first payment.
- One lifetime limit. Changing funds would not restart the four-payment allowance.
- A review before expansion. Check the first group’s outcomes before extending the scheme.
The baseline controls when a payment can be made. It is not insurance against market losses and does not guarantee a retirement balance.
What taking the cash would cost later
A payout stops compounding once it leaves the account. In the campaign model’s fixed-cap example, a $100,000 starting balance receives $40,000 across four early payments, but has about $108,000 less in the account at year 20 than the no-payout comparison.
Illustration, not forecast: a steady 8% annual account return, 2.7% CPI and $8,000 credited at each year end for 20 years. The floor is indexed before each year’s new contribution is added. Payments occur at year end after growth and contributions. No additional fee, insurance or tax deductions are modelled separately; actual net returns and contributions would differ.
| Starting balance | Early payouts: years 3, 6, 9, 12 | Total early cash | Year-20 balance gap: early | Year-20 gap: payouts in years 9, 12, 15, 18 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $60,000 | $8.9k, then $10k three times | $39k | $104k | $68k |
| $100,000 | $10k four times | $40k | $108k | $68k |
| $150,000 | $10k four times | $40k | $108k | $68k |
For the $100,000 example, the no-payout account is approximately $832,191 at year 20. The early gap is about 13% of that figure; the later gap is about 8%. The later schedule means the first payment is in year 9, not that opt-in occurs in year 9 and payments begin three years after that.
Indexation changes the answer. The draft’s quoted figures use a fixed nominal $10,000 cap. They do not cost its indexed-cap design. If the cap is indexed by 2.7% from year 1, with every other assumption unchanged, the early schedule produces:
| Starting balance | Total cash received | Year-20 balance gap |
|---|---|---|
| $60,000 | $47,141 | $122,624 |
| $100,000 | $49,042 | $129,658 |
| $150,000 | $49,042 | $129,658 |
Both tables use nominal dollars, deterministic returns and the same 20-year horizon. Neither is a lifetime pension forecast, a present-value comparison or a fiscal costing. Under the fixed-cap $100,000 example, every $1 of early cash means roughly $2.70 less at year 20; the later schedule means roughly $1.70 less. Different timing, returns or fees change those ratios.
Other schedules need their own test
The source draft also considers five two-yearly payouts, a one-year-on/three-years-off pattern and uncapped releases. Each changes cash availability and lost compounding. Those alternatives need an explicit schedule, floor rule and reproducible model before being compared as settled results.
The questions that need answers
- Low balances and interrupted work: test the effect on people with caring breaks, insecure work or very little super. A government-funded minimum would have a fiscal cost not yet modelled.
- Tax: tax-free payouts are proposed, not established. Specify the treatment of earnings and benefits, and cost forgone revenue.
- Fund operations: define liquidity, valuation dates, contributions net of deductions, insurance and fee treatment, transfers, multiple accounts, defined benefits and fraud controls.
- Market risk: test poor returns and their sequence, inflation shocks and whether payments can leave members persistently behind.
- Behaviour: test reduced contributions, reliance on expected payouts and pressure to opt in.
- System costs: assess retirement adequacy, Age Pension effects, administrative costs and who ultimately bears them.
This proposal has not been fiscally costed. The 8% return is a modelling assumption, not a promised or independently established future fund return.
What would have to change
This is a proposed change to Commonwealth law, not a payment available today. Super can currently be released only when a legal condition is met. Existing early-access arrangements do not provide a general right to withdraw investment growth.
The proposal would need a new condition of release, a decision on tax treatment, rules for funds to administer it and independent fiscal costing. A Victorian MP cannot make those changes through state law.
Current early-access rules · Sources, assumptions and model boundaries
Put it to Canberra. Publish the answer.
We produce proposals like this so people have something concrete to judge: what they could receive, what it would cost and how it could work.
The next step is to seek independent scrutiny and costing, put the proposal to Commonwealth Treasury, federal representatives and the responsible minister, and publish their responses. Local evidence and public support would be part of that case. If elected, I would also use the Victorian parliamentary platform to seek support for Commonwealth consideration.
If the numbers do not hold up, the design changes. If they do, and people want it, then the question becomes who will act.
We should know where it gets stuck, who is responsible and why. Then remember that answer the next time we vote federally.